How Ukraine lost its south: NV examines reasons for Russia’s rapid seizure of territory

One of the most controversial issues discussed in Ukrainian society and the government is why the Russians were able to take over the south of Ukraine so quickly. From this also follows the question of who removed the minefields near Crimea, allowing the invaders to flood into Ukraine almost unhindered.

For almost two years, even the military and political leadership of the country have been named among the culprits.

In fact, a better question to ask is who mined the south in the first place? The answer is simple: nobody.

Three informed sources in the country’s military leadership assured NV that no demining of bridges, isthmuses, or territories on the border with the Crimean Peninsula took place before the full-scale invasion. The crux of the matter is an altogether different matter: the south should not have been mined.

This seemingly absurd statement has a logical explanation. It is based on the analysis of those mistakes that existed in Ukraine’s preparation for the war.

"Without mobilization, there was no chance of us holding"

The exact number of Russian troops that invaded Ukraine in February 2022 is unknown. But a week before the start of the full-scale war, on February 15, 2022, U.S. President Joe Biden talked about "more than 150 thousand". But according to assessments by Yohan Michel, an analyst at the International Institute for Strategic Studies, there were 200,000 Russian military personnel next to the Ukrainian border at the beginning of the invasion. This number of troops is equivalent to approximately 40-50 brigades.

As of February 24, 2022, the Ukrainian General Staff had 24 infantry brigades at its disposal. 12 of them were maintaining the defense of the Joint Forces Operation (JFO) zone, namely Luhansk and Donetsk oblasts. There were five brigades in the northern JFO sector (with another one in reserve), and the same situation in the southern sector.

Abbreviations used: SMB (Separate Mechanized Brigade), SMAB (Separate Mountain Assault Brigade), STB (Separate Tank Brigade), SMIB (Separate Mechanized Infantry Brigade), SAB (Separate Assault Brigade), SAAB (Separate Air Assault Brigade), SMaBa (Separate Marine Battalion), SMaB (Separate Marine Brigade), and SMeB (Separate Mechanized Brigade). / Infographics: NV

The rest of Ukraine’s brigades were being stationed throughout the country. At the same time, they were protecting key areas. No additional units were created to repel the attack from the south and north.

Thus, according to information collected by NV, there were seven brigades on the northern border.

The 14th Mechanized Brigade from Volyn held the border with Belarus. The 10th Mountain Assault Division, located further east, also protected the border.

The area of ​​responsibility of the 72nd Mechanized Brigade from Bila Tserkva was Kyiv.

Chernihiv was held by the 1st Tank Division. The 58th Motorized Infantry from Konotop was deployed towards Sumy and was responsible for protecting Hlukhiv.

Further eastern territories — Sumy and Kharkiv — were defended by the 93rd and 92nd mechanized brigades.

Near Dnipro  City, at the Novomoskovskiy training ground, the 128th Mountain Assault Regiment was stationed. It’s a reserve formation that was supposed to advance either to the east or to the south, to Zaporizhzhya.

Another reserve brigade, the 80th Assault Brigade, was stationed near Mykolaiv, at the Shirokiy Lan training ground. This unit subsequently played a significant role in the defense of Mykolaiv.

Odesa was defended from a possible Russian landing by two more brigades — the 28th Mechanized and the 35th Marines.

But there was only one brigade on Dnipro River’s left bank in Kherson Oblast and in the direction of Melitopol — the 59th Separate Motorized Infantry. It was located at the Oleshkivski Pisky training ground. In addition, the 137th Marine Infantry Battalion was located directly on the administrative border with occupied Crimea.

In peacetime, all these rear units had, according to NV, an average of 60% of their full troop complement. Without mobilization and the introduction of martial law, it was impossible to bolster their ranks. Therefore, the 59th brigade had about 1,500 soldiers.

"The artillery was not fully formed up, as two divisions were training in Divichki in Kyiv Oblast, and the engineering support group was also on training in Kamianets-Podilskyi. There were also about 250 people in the 137th Marine Battalion, which was 50% manned. Some of them were conscripts who were conducting stabilization operations on the border with Crimea," said Major General Andrii Sokolov in an interview with Ukrainska Pravda (UP) about the forces at his disposal. At the time of the full-scale invasion, he was the commander of Operational Command South.

So it turns out that from the side of Crimea, the Russians who attacked Ukrainian forces had a numerical advantage of at least 12 to 1. According to Sokolov, 20,000-25,000 Russian troops advanced against 1,750 Ukrainian soldiers.

One brigade was entirely insufficient to hold the south. "Operational expediency demanded that we have at least 4 combat brigades in this direction," a General Staff source told NV.

"Considering the situation as of February 24, 2022, there was no possibility of moving additional forces from among those available for the defense of the southern region without a significant risk of weakening the defense capabilities in other directions of invasion, first and foremost from the north of Kyiv," our source said.

"Without mobilization, there was no chance of holding. Without covert or overt mobilization, it was impossible to increase the numbers in our army. On what legal grounds would you ‘bring up’ the number of troops to the required level?" explained Viktor Chumak, Major General in the Ministry of Justice Reserve and, so far, the last chief military prosecutor of Ukraine (the position has now been abolished).

 "And what was there to transfer to the South? Where? From the East? There was just as dangerous a direction," he added.

In fact, had there been early mobilization, the Armed Forces would have had enough troops very quickly. After all, the Law "On the Foundations of National Resistance" entered into force on January 1, 2022, establishing Territorial Defense Forces (TDF).

TDF played an important role, for example, in the defense of Kyiv, Chernihiv, and Kharkiv. In the first days of the war, the Kherson TDF did not even have time to deploy before they were encircled by the Russians.

The south was not supposed to have been mined

In addition to troop numbers, the lack of martial law was also a problem. It was introduced starting at 5:30 a.m. on February 24 across the country, when Russian missiles were already flying, enemy planes were bombing cities, and enemy armored columns were crossing the border.

Martial law is a special legal regime that may be introduced throughout Ukraine or in some of its regions in case of armed aggression, threat of attack, or danger to the country’s sovereignty or territorial integrity.

What does it provide for? It puts power into the hands of the military. Military administrations are created, the population is evacuated from areas of possible hostilities, and restrictions on movement are applied. Most importantly, the government may forcibly appropriate civilian property or use it for the purposes of national defense.

The last point is key for preparing areas for defense.

"What does it mean to mine land? Whose lands? Come into gardens and mine them? There are also fields where farmers are working. How can the military do this?" says Chumak, explaining that without martial law, it is forbidden to mine private land without special authority.

The same applies to the construction of defensive fortifications and trenches: the military cannot just come and dig a trench on private land without a legal basis.

"The Cabinet of Ministers is supposed to take care of expropriating the lands necessary for defense. If these were state-owned lands or reserve lands, the Cabinet of Ministers could temporarily transfer them to the Ministry of Defense or buy them back and hand them over to the Ministry of Defense. Otherwise, there is no way,” Chumak claims.

Therefore, the isthmus with Crimea, the border areas with Belarus, and the areas around ​​Chornobyl, Chernihiv, Sumy, and Kharkiv could not be mined, and defensive fortifications could not be built there. After all, all these listed territories were, in legal terms, as peaceful as, for example, Vinnytsia or Zakarpattya oblasts.

Therefore, for all 8 years since the beginning of the occupation of Crimea, there were neither sufficient forces, nor legal grounds, nor conditions for defense against a full-scale invasion from the south.

Since 2014, Ukraine has had three Supreme Commanders in Chief — acting President Oleksandr Turchynov, President Petro Poroshenko, and his successor Volodymyr Zelenskyy. Kherson’s legal status as a peaceful region remained unchanged under each of them.

NV asked for explanations from each of the three former heads of state.

Turchynov acted as president after Viktor Yanukovych fled the country, from February to June 2014. It was during this period that the occupation of the Crimean Peninsula and military operations in Donbas began. He explained to NV that in 2014, according to the Strategic Plan for the Use of the Armed Forces approved by him, defensive lines and mine barriers were created "in front of the narrow exit from Crimea." The document was not intended to be published.

Turchynov explained the decision not to introduce martial law at the time with a reluctance to limit citizens’ rights. "In order to build reliable defense lines, there is no need to limit the rights and freedoms of citizens (freedom of speech, mass events, confiscation of property, cancellation of elections, etc.), which martial law entails," he clarified.

Poroshenko had a similar reasoning, NV found. "A measure as extreme as the introduction of martial law is not mandatory for the construction of defense structures, but does ravage the economy," the former president argued in comments to NV.

"The decision to construct certain defense lines is made on the basis of the Strategic Plan for the use of the Armed Forces, which the General Staff submits to the Supreme Commander-in-Chief. This document indicates the directions of greatest danger and potential enemy attacks. According to the plan, defensive lines are to be strengthened in these directions," Poroshenko explained.

President Zelenskyy’s office declined to comment.

In private conversations, military officials have complained to NV that from the beginning and before the full-scale invasion, none of Ukraine’s presidents have taken full responsibility for the arrangement of a comprehensive defense in the southern direction. None of them ensured the availability of a sufficient number of troops or legal grounds for digging trenches and mining the land, like how the Russians have mined the occupied territories by now.

"It was practically impossible to ensure stable defense in the Crimean direction without the early introduction of martial law and the decision to use the Armed Forces," the General Staff told NV.

The issue of introducing martial law and mobilization in Ukraine had been considered since the beginning of 2022 at the parliamentary Defense Committee, according to committee secretary Roman Kostenko.

"We talked about mobilization, about reservists, and about increasing financing for the army. At the beginning, sometime in January 2022, [Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces Valery] Zaluzhnyi came before us. He said that there was no need for mobilization yet," the MP from Holos explained to NV.

Closer to the invasion, the general’s rhetoric changed, as Zaluzhnyi said he supported increasing the army’s numbers. "The more troops, the better for me," Kostenko quotes him as saying.

"I came to [military intelligence chief Kyrylo] Budanov. He said: ‘War, war.’ I asked him: ‘Are you reporting [this] to the Office [of the President]? Why don't you advise them that we need to mobilize, call people up, and dig trenches?''

At the beginning of the full-scale invasion, Kostenko, a soldier himself, served in the defense of Mykolaiv.

Zelenskyy signed an order for the call-up of reservists in a special period only on February 22, 2022, and it went into effect on February 23. A day later, the war began, and some reservists did not even have time to reach their local headquarters.

These were the president’s words from his address on the evening of February 22, when he announced the call-up of reservists.

"Right now, as I am recording this video, it's 10 p.m. Kyiv time. As I promised, I am speaking openly about all our actions so that you understand exactly what is happening in Ukraine and beyond... Today there is no need for a general mobilization. We need to quickly replenish the Ukrainian army and other military formations. I, as the Supreme Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces of Ukraine, have issued an order on the call-up of reservists."

NV wrote to presidential press secretary Serhii Nikiforov requesting an explanation of why Zelenskyy made the decision to call up reservists only a day and a half before the invasion. Nikiforov declined to comment.

What about the east?

At the start of the full-scale invasion, the war in the JFO zone had been going on for 8 years. In Donbas, Ukrainian troops had equipped defensive positions, some of which are still standing today.

In the east, Ukrainian forces had the legal right to dig in, mine territories, and carry out all necessary actions thanks to the adoption of the Law on the Reintegration of Donbas in January 2018.

It was this law which transformed the anti-terrorist operation (ATO), led by the SBU, into the Joint Forces Operation, where all leadership was handed over to the military.

The same law introduced a special regime (similar to martial law) and created military-civilian administrations whose activities were coordinated by military command. Therefore, the military in Donbas had no problems with allocating land plots for the construction of fortifications or the installation of landmine barriers.

In addition, the final provisions of the law approved the decision of the President to use the Armed Forces to repel and contain the armed aggression of the Russian Federation in Donetsk and Luhansk oblasts.

The use, or deployment, of the Armed Forces is the third important element of the military's legal authority.

A fuse removed too late

Ukraine has a specific law  "On Defense," which regulates a clear procedure in case of aggression or the threat of one.

It follows from Article 4 of this law that in the event of aggression, the Supreme Commander (president) must perform four actions: start a general or partial mobilization; introduce martial law; make a decision on the use of the Armed Forces; and inform the parliament of a state of war in the country.

The first two points are discussed above. The fourth is the "state of war," which is not regulated by national legislation. The remaining provision is on "the use of the Armed Forces."

On February 24, 2022, President Zelenskyy signed the decree on the use of armed forces. This meant that from this date on, military commanders received the right to issue combat orders to units to repel aggression throughout the entire territory of Ukraine.

The rule on the "use of the Armed Forces" is a safeguard against the intervention of the army in internal conflicts. In other words: the army cannot be used to disperse rallies or suppress protests. The army is meant to deal with external threats. In the case of an external armed aggression, the Supreme Commander gives the order to use the Armed Forces.

The law "On Defense" also states that the military may, without waiting for a declaration of war, take measures to repel aggression. Therefore, apparently, as NV’s sources explain, the rapid loss of the south should be considered a result of a series of reasons, and the actions of both the political and military leadership should be evaluated. The same applies to the actions and inactions of the special services, the government, and other participants in the defense of Ukraine.

(to be continued)

In the second part of the material regarding the events in the south, NV will discuss how this region ended up being mined after all, although it was not supposed to be by law, as well as how the military prepared defenses there, how they were checked, and why nothing happened in the end.

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