How destruction of Russian ships in Crimea may affect Moscow’s plans – expert interview
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Maksym Palamarchuk, an expert of Ukraine’s National Institute for Strategic Studies, explained in an interview with NV Radio on Sept. 13 how the recent missile strike on a drydock in Russia-occupied Sevastopol may affect the war in the Black Sea.
NV: Let’s start with what significance this large-scale attack on Sevastopol and the fire at the drydock might have for us, for the future liberation of Crimea and our victory?
Palamarchuk: First of all, if it was indeed damaged, most likely, judging by the extent of the damage, the submarine has permanently been put hors de combat, which means minus one Kalibr [cruise missile] carrier. Moreover, it was a Kalibr carrier with a modest volley, but can covertly approach Ukrainian shores. In addition, the destruction of a landing ship is also very important.
Not because the Ukrainians are threatened by a Russian landing force, but because their role is very significant in the supply of weapons and supplies to the Russian troops occupying the southern regions of Ukraine and currently suffering significant losses and expenses in battles with Ukrainian defenders.
And it’s worth noting that the drydock itself is also important. Given the damage to the facility, the enemy’s ability to repair damage to their ships will decrease. For example, even damage from a naval drone, which used to be able to take a ship out of action for six months, can now put it hors de combat for the rest of the war.
NV: Let’s talk in more detail about this drydock. It was billed as the main repair base of the Russian Black Sea Fleet. Is this really the case and why haven’t they moved this main repair base somewhere since the start of the full-scale invasion?
Palamarchuk: Yes, this is really a base plant for servicing the Russian Navy. There are already problems here, it’s not a structure that can be moved somewhere. As we remember, after the start of hostilities, Turkey, in strict compliance with the Montreux Convention, closed the Bosporus to Russian warships, as well as warships of any other countries. Russia cannot take them to other places for repair, except by inland waterways. And moving the plant is, to put it mildly, harder than to build a new one.
NV: Let’s talk about those damaged vessels, ships. According to Ukraine’s Defense Intelligence, those could be the Rostov-on-Don Kilo-class submarine, which Russia used to attack Ukraine, as well as the Ropucha-class landing ship Minsk. Can you tell us more about them?
Palamarchuk: The landing ship, like most Russian landing ships, is an old Soviet ship built in Poland. The problem is that the Russians cannot actually replace them. Therefore, in this case, what is important is not how much it could cost on the foreign market, but the fact that it’s an irreplaceable asset. Because even if they theoretically can bring corvettes with Kalibr missiles by inland waterways, at least from the Caspian Sea, large landing ships simply cannot get to the Black Sea until the end of the war.
As for the Rostov-on-Don submarine, it’s a relatively new Russian submarine. This is indeed a very heavy loss for the Russian fleet. As far as I know, about a dozen submarines have been built under this project. Again, the possibility of their transportation by inland waterways is, let’s say, at least in question.
In any case, the money spent on this ship is probably somewhere about $300 million, which is a significant amount. Moreover, such a ship cannot be rebuilt quickly, unlike, for example, armored personnel carriers or to some extent even airplanes. A ship is something that takes a long time to build. And in the conditions of Russian sanctions, it could be an irreversible loss.
NV: They say this is a Kilo-class submarine, what does that mean to us? And what submarines, of what class are currently present in Russia, how can you describe them in general?
Palamarchuk: Russia has a very large collection of submarines of various eras, both Soviet and modern vessels. In general, there are three types of submarines in Russia: nuclear with ballistic missiles, part of the nuclear triad; there are submarines armed with cruise missiles (also nuclear powered), and finally diesel-electric submarines, one of which was damaged or destroyed in Sevastopol.
Six submarines were deployed in the Black Sea at the beginning of hostilities, including three “of the same type as Rostov-on-Don” and one older, Soviet-era submarine, called Alrosa since the same-name Russian diamond mining company sponsored the ship. As for the latter, its combat capability is now in question.
NV: Why were they not transferred from Sevastopol to somewhere further away, for example, to the port of Novorossiysk? Although we remember that Russian ships are also vulnerable there – Olenegorsky Gornyak [landing ship] is such an example.
Palamarchuk: Submarines are usually based in the Black Sea Fleet’s port of Novorossiysk, in most cases. But let’s not forget the vessel was being repaired in this case. Again, the vessel was moored where the relevant facilities were located.
NV: How vulnerable does the Russian Black Sea Fleet look now, given this, God willing, not the last attack, what are its weakest points?
Palamarchuk: The damage to repair capabilities is the Black Sea Fleet’s weakest point, which has significantly subsided. Given that the size of Ukrainian naval drones almost excludes the sinking of a ship, unless there is a very successful attack, the repair capabilities made it possible to put them back into service relatively quickly. After the loss of such repair capabilities, we can hope that the Black Sea Fleet’s overall missile volley and its ability to launch Kalibr missiles will diminish over time.
As for the others, there are more hidden issues, for example, the question of how effectively Russian ships can undergo regular maintenance. Because Russian engines aren’t very reliable, they must undergo repairs quite often, process this engine so that it doesn’t fail at a crucial moment. And a situation is quite possible when the ships are formally intact, but in reality, their seaworthiness is very limited.
NV: What Russian actions can be predicted in the near future? Will everything that is left in Sevastopol be removed somewhere, will they try to respond with something?
Palamarchuk: I think that attempts to harm Ukraine are long-standing, as soon as they have such an opportunity, they implement it without trying to link it to anything. No need to engage in all these Russian talks that this is the answer to this and that is the answer to that. The war is ongoing, and they’re trying to harm us as much as possible, while we’re trying to harm their military machine as much as possible.
As for the Russians’ reaction, they will first determine what was affected. I don’t think they kept a large array of ships in Sevastopol before that. They will look for opportunities to somehow find alternative sites for repairing their own ships. There’s also a shipbuilding enterprise, although it dealt mainly with civilian vessels in Soviet times, but now it works on Russian helicopters, helicopter carriers, analogues of Mistrals [French-made amphibious assault ships], and the Zalyv shipyard. Maybe they’ll try to somehow develop it.
NV: But where?
Palamarchuk: The Zalyv shipyard is outside Kerch [in eastern Crimea]. <...> If it was an air attack, it will be more difficult for us than in Sevastopol as it’s located deeper into Russia-held territory. But in any case, it was a powerful strike, it’s a strike, I’m not afraid of this word, of strategic importance. And we shouldn’t forget that to demonstrate to our allies that their contributions to Ukraine are contributions to European security.
Because let’s not forget that Kalibr missiles are, in principle, available in both standard and nuclear configurations. Destroying the carrier of these missiles, which could also launch them covertly, is a significant improvement of the overall security situation in Europe.
NV: Let’s also talk about the fact that, obviously, this attack was a combined one, both the Air Force and surface drones were engaged in it. How effective are such attacks, what can you say about them?
Palamarchuk: I don’t think it’s a combined attack in the classical sense, when different submarines and aviation, etc. are working at the same time. Because as far as I understand, the drone attack was carried out during the transition, according to official reports. The damaged ships were in a drydock, meaning that naval drones couldn’t reach them.
But in principle, the increase in potential is an interesting effect, because if we combine an attack by two means, it significantly complicates and overloads both the ship’s crew and its combat information systems, making it more likely that the ship will be hit.
NV: Still, what can we expect in the near future and from the Ukrainian side, I think so, such attacks, God willing, will continue?
Palamarchuk: I also hope for it, but we must be careful here, because you understand that every such attack isn’t just taking off and launching missiles. First, we must have these missiles, besides, we must plan the operation. And I would like to draw attention to the fact that this operation took place after Ukraine regained control of oil and gas offshore platforms in the Black Sea [on Sept. 12]. As far as I understand, the restoration of this control made this operation possible as it allowed to blind Russia’s first defense line and, for example, our pilots could get close enough to launch [Strom Shadow cruise] missiles, albeit at a risk.
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